






COMMANDER'S DIGEST

VOL. 14, NO. 3/JULY 19, 1973

**Sec. Schlesinger
Discusses DoD Role**

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**New Defense Secretary
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Public Understanding for DoD Commitments Asked



James R. Schlesinger (center), the new Secretary of Defense, affixes his signature to the Defense Department's Human Goals document. (DoD Photo by Frank Hall)

James R. Schlesinger was sworn in as the 12th Secretary of Defense at San Clemente, California, on July 2. Previously, Mr. Schlesinger served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

At a hearing on June 18 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Schlesinger was questioned at length as to his views on important Defense Department matters.

Following are excerpts of comments made at the Senate hearing by the new Secretary of Defense, who was later confirmed by the Senate on June 28 by a vote of 91 to 0.

Public Understanding

An eminent challenge is support and understanding by the American public and its representatives in the Congress for the Defense commitments and objectives of the American Government.

The Department of Defense, as one of the units of American society, must provide assistance and support, as America redevelops a sense of national purpose and cohesion which, for a variety of reasons, had been somewhat frayed in the Vietnam War period. The society as a whole, it seems to me, is dependent upon a feeling of shared purpose. Rebuilding that feeling is a critical problem which, of course, transcends the Department of Defense but in which the Department of Defense must share. **I regard the rebuilding of that national cohesion as a fundamental national goal.**

Associated with national unity is the rebuilding of the understanding and appreciation for our defense commitments on the part of the American public and its perception of the dedication and sense of responsibility of the men and women in our Armed Forces. This perception has become somewhat less evident in recent years than it was in earlier periods of time.

These feelings and perceptions are fundamental to our society. Unless we can build upon them, I think that we will continue to be in some difficulty as a Department. I regard it as an obligation to attempt to help rebuild public confidence in this Department, its people and its part in the Nation's overall national security system. **The American people must honor the dedication of the men and women who devote themselves to national purposes and understand the broad national purposes which concern us all.**

Total Force Concept

I believe that Total Force Concept is one of the most productive concepts that former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird developed in his intellectual grappling with the issues of U.S. defense and Alliance defense, in fact. I think that in a number of respects it provides us with a better guide to the structuring of the Department of Defense.

In the [Total Force] area which I was discussing—the question of the various deterrents across a spectrum of risks—there has been some tendency in the past to look at strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear or conventional forces exclusively as substitutes for one another. . . . In the past, we have been inclined to keep these forces in separate categories. Similarly, with regard to our forces and the forces of our Allies, we must remember, for example, with respect to naval forces, that if the question is the resupply of Europe, we must assume that the European nations will be willing to provide their naval forces with that objective in mind and that one should, for such exercises, look at NATO naval forces as a whole rather than simply United States versus the Soviet Union.

Women in the Service

I believe that the Department of Defense is firmly committed to the concept of equal opportunity for women in the Service. It was the policy of Defense Secretaries Laird and Elliot L. Richardson, and it will certainly be my policy to eliminate all unnecessary distinctions in regulations applying to Servicewomen and equal treatment in the military. The Services have removed many barriers that previously existed for women which were within the purview of the Services to change. In addition, the Department of Defense did, and currently does, support not only the proposed legislation to eliminate distinctions in dependency criteria which the Supreme Court has now ruled on but also proposed legislation to eliminate enlistment age criteria differences between men and women, which is still pending before Congress (H.R. 3418).

Drug, Alcohol Abuse

I propose to continue the policy of preventing and eliminating drug abuse within the Armed Forces, and as far as possible to restore any members involved to useful service. In order to prevent drug abuse or addiction, I feel that a policy of prevention through education and of early identification is of paramount importance.

Those members who, in spite of our preventive efforts, do become involved should receive treatment at in-Service facilities, with the objective of returning them to their units for continuing useful service.

Remarks of New DoD Secretary at Swearing-In

On this occasion of formal welcome as Secretary of Defense, many thoughts come to mind. I am duly awed by the responsibilities of the office to which the President has called me. I am deeply grateful for the support and encouragement generously given by all members of the Department of Defense. And for the first time as Secretary of Defense, I have the privilege of saluting the men and women of our Armed Forces. The United States has called you to great and sometimes onerous duties, which you have unswervingly performed with dedication and skill. A rekindling of the public appreciation of that dedication is a task of high priority.

Our Defense establishment exists for but one objective: to protect the national entity, its commitments and interests. Weapon systems, force structure, doctrine concern all of us deeply. Of vital importance is the effective use of resources. But as we contemplate the national entity in the present climate, we may recognize that these instruments are in some sense secondary. So, let me take this occasion to speak to you about those larger matters that a Secretary of Defense does not normally have the opportunity to discuss.

At this point in our Nation's history, our social fabric is, sadly, somewhat frayed—reflecting the conflicts over the war in Southeast Asia as well as nagging domestic discontents. We in this Department draw our strength from a healthy and stable society. Restoration of a sense of national unity and purpose must therefore be our highest objective. Consequently, we should be aware of these deeper ailments—social and economic. Some of these stem from substantive imbalances in our society; some from a currently fashionable spirit of nihilistic individualism troubling all of our Western societies.

It is our high obligation to preserve for the future this Nation—and to permit the continued flourishing of the free institutions and the social attitudes it represents. Excellence [of leadership and management] within the Department of Defense are, I believe, some of those characteristics necessary to a restored sense of national unity and purpose. The members of this Department demonstrate the type of dedication on which the Na-

tion must draw. The Armed Forces historically have displayed the discipline and the pooling of effort for common purposes that serve as cure for self-centeredness and for individualism gone awry. This example can assist us as our Nation strives after a new—dare I use the term?—consensus.

Within the Department we shall be obliged to exhibit patience and self-restraint. We must be prepared to accept adjustment and change. There are luxuries that we shall have to do without. There are apparent necessities which, in light of our budgetary restraints, we shall have to acquire more slowly than some would like. There are some aspects of Service parochialism which we shall have to discard—a parochialism, understandable and even defensible, in light of Service pride and the belief of each Service in itself as a separate mission-oriented organization. But we must temper this parochialism, while retaining Service pride and tradition, and subsume it within the broader mission of this Nation's military establishment.

Our Nation's military posture cannot depend upon atmospherics or the hoped-for goodwill and forbearance of potential foes. It must be based on a sober assessment of the risks and the military capabilities presented on the world scene—rather than on soothing words. A structure of peace—which we all ardently seek—requires the maintenance of a force structure which adequately reflects and maintains the military realities and the balance of political power.

This task requires a long term perspective—unperturbed by euphoria or despair. Logically and realistically this perspective should encompass the same time-frame as the generation of peace for which we strive. It requires dedication to purpose, steadiness of effort and stability in attitude.

Let me assure you that I shall do my best to contribute to that stability and steadiness in this Department. I call on all of you for your best effort in the challenging period ahead.

Let us go forward with appreciation of our Nation's destiny, with a renewed dedication to our mission, and with high hopes for the future and our own role in achieving this Nation's common purposes.

Of course, there will be those Service members who will not cooperate in treatment and rehabilitation programs or who are drug traffickers. Appropriate disciplinary and administrative actions should be taken in these cases dependent upon all the facts and circumstances involved.

With regard to the abuse of alcohol, it seems to me that the Military Departments should be responsible for developing education, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation programs to reduce and control alcohol abuse.

All-Volunteer Force

I think that we all recognize that it will not necessarily be easy to maintain a force structure of the size that the United States wishes to maintain on a volunteer basis. I think that we have all determined to make that attempt, but it will not be an easy road. We must make every effort by providing the comparative attractiveness of a career in the military equivalent to that in civilian life. I think there may be in recent years, largely as a result of Vietnam, something of an unfavorable public reaction to military life, and this general atmosphere is not conducive to recruitment. But by and large,

we are going to make this attempt, and I am hopeful that it will be successful. [But] I cannot guarantee that it will be successful.

Congressional Relations

I recognize, within the Constitutional framework of the United States, the importance of close collaboration between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. I have worked over the years, I think, quite well with the Congress. I

hope that we [both Branches] will be able to work closely together in the collaborative effort to maintain the defense posture of the United States.

I have worked in the last four months with this Committee [the Senate Armed Services] and I have great respect for the members of this Committee. I know that each of the members of the Committee has worked for many years on the problems of the Department of Defense, and is fully cognizant of the problems of



A Roster of Former Secretaries of the Defense Department

James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy from May 1944, until he took the oath of office as the first Secretary of Defense on September 17, 1947, served as head of the new National Military Establishment until March 27, 1949.

Louis Johnson, a former Assistant Secretary of the Army, was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on March 28, 1949, and served until September 19, 1950.

George Catlett Marshall, General of the Army, World War II Chief of Staff of the Army, former Secretary of State, and President of the National Red Cross, was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on September 21, 1950, and served until his retirement on September 12, 1951.

Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State under General Marshall, and Deputy Secretary of Defense under General Marshall, succeeded the General as Secretary of Defense on September 17, 1951, serving until January 20, 1953.

Charles E. Wilson, president of General Motors, was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on January 28, 1953, and served until October 8, 1957.

Neil H. McElroy, president of Proctor and Gamble Company,

was sworn in on October 9, 1957. He resigned December 1, 1959.

Thomas S. Gates Jr., former Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense, was sworn in on December 2, 1959, and served until January 20, 1961.

Robert S. McNamara, president of Ford Motor Company, was sworn in on January 21, 1961, and served until February 29, 1968.

Clark M. Clifford, member of Clifford-Miller law firm, was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on March 1, 1968, and served until January 20, 1969.

Melvin R. Laird, member of U.S. House of Representatives, representing the Seventh District of Wisconsin, was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on January 22, 1969, and served until January 29, 1973.

Elliot L. Richardson, former Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, Under Secretary of State, and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, was sworn in on January 30, 1973, as Secretary of Defense and served until May 25, 1973.

the Department, and in many areas will have special knowledge which I cannot hope to attain over a period of months or years. So I stand ready to draw on your knowledge and I hope that we can have a collaborative relationship.

Defense Budget

Military activities of the United States have been steadily and significantly re-

duced since 1969. This has been done, consistent with the Vietnamization policy and the explicit decision of the Administration to end the war and to alter national priorities in favor of greater spending on domestic needs. Unlike earlier wars in the Nation's history, these enormous reductions in defense activities have been taken coincidentally with the end of the war so that we find ourselves,

as the war comes to a conclusion, already in the position of having a smaller military force than we had before the war began—in fact, a smaller military force than at any time since the Korean War.

These dramatic reductions in defense activities have been disguised by the marked pay-and-price increases during these recent years. But it is nonetheless the case that Defense spending has been

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUMMARY OF SELECTED ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES

	Actual		Estimated	
	June 30, 1968	June 30, 1972	June 30, 1973	June 30, 1974
Military Personnel (in thousands)				
End Strength:				
Army	1,570	811	825	804
Navy	765	588	574	566
Marine Corps	307	198	197	196
Air Force	905	726	692	666
Total DOD	3,547	2,322	2,288	2,233
Average Strength:				
Army	1,487	955	844	821
Navy	752	604	583	576
Marine Corps	298	202	197	197
Air Force	899	750	709	683
Total DOD	3,436	2,512	2,333	2,277
Strategic Forces:				
Intercontinental ballistic missiles				
MINUTEMAN	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
TITAN II	54	54	54	54
POLARIS-POSEIDON	656	656	656	656
Strategic-bomber squadrons	40	30	30	28
General Purpose Forces:				
Land Forces:				
Army divisions:	18	13	13	13
Marine Corps divisions:	4	3	3	3
Tactical Air Force:				
Air Force wings	25	21	21	21
Navy attack wings	15	14	14	14
Marine Corps wings	3	3	3	3
Naval Forces:				
Attack and anti-submarine carriers	23	17	16	15
Nuclear attack submarines	33	56	60	64
Other warships	387	279	244	191
Amphibious assault warships	157	77	65	65
Airlift and Sealift Forces:				
C-5A aircraft squadrons	0	4	4	4
Other strategic aircraft squadrons	32	13	13	13
Troopships, cargoships, and tankers	130	87	63	57

held stable over the last five years, despite these pay and price increases, and notwithstanding the additional costs of moving, with full Congressional approval, to an All-Volunteer Force—and [as] we have been increasing enormously the amount of Federal spending on domestic programs (while Federal spending on other problems goes up \$94 billion from FY 1968 to FY 1974, Defense spending only increased \$1 billion in that same period). It is clear to me that the budgetary dividend, resulting from the ending of the war, has been paid out continually over the past four years, well ahead of the negotiation of a cease-fire agreement last January.

I obviously cannot at this point testify myself as to whether or not true savings are possible on certain programs in the FY 1974 budget. Budget reductions, of course, are always possible. But budget reductions should not be confused with savings. Budget reductions may only defer, at higher long-term cost, expenditures that will have to be made at a later date. Budget reductions could imply a lowered state of readiness, which could be very costly indeed, if the contingencies for which we maintain a Defense establishment should occur.

I do know that the budget was carefully prepared by [former] Defense Secretary Laird and closely reviewed and approved by the President. I do know that it was reviewed by [former] Defense Secretary Richardson, who supported it at the present level. Consequently, while I cannot give personal detailed assurances, I am confident that it is a well-founded budget. I will, of course, be looking for

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

National Security Agency—Established December 5, 1952

Director—Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips, USAF

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—Established February 7, 1958

Director—Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik

Defense Nuclear Agency—Established May 6, 1959 (formerly the Defense Atomic Support Agency and prior to that, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project).

Director—Lieutenant General C. H. Dunn, USA

Defense Communications Agency—Established May 12, 1960

Director—Lieutenant General Gordon T. Gould Jr., USAF

Defense Intelligence Agency—Established August 1, 1961

Director—Vice Admiral V. P. de Poix, USN

Defense Supply Agency—Established October 1, 1961

Director—Lieutenant General Wallace H. Robinson Jr., USMC

Defense Contract Audit Agency—Established July 1, 1965

Director—B. B. Lynn

Defense Security Assistance Agency—Established September 1, 1971

Director—Vice Admiral Ray Peet, USN

Defense Mapping Agency—Established January 1, 1972

Director—Major General Howard W. Penney, USA

Civil Preparedness Agency—Established May 5, 1972

Director—John E. Davis

Defense Investigative Service—Established October 1, 1972

Director—Brigadier General Joseph J. Cappucci, USAF

economies and efficiencies in defense operations and management, and I will particularly look at the support structure to insure that combat capability is optimized. If there are possibilities for savings, you may be assured that I will pursue them. At the same time, I will be looking for deficiencies in our defense programs, and I will be equally diligent in reporting these to the Congress. I can assure you that I will recommend no more and no less than I believe is essential to an adequate defense posture for the United States.

Reduction of Troops in Europe

At this stage, I would recommend no reduction. I would want to underscore that we are preparing now for discussions with the Soviets in which we are consulting with our Allies with respect to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. It seems to me it would be unwise, in the extreme, at this stage for the United States unilaterally to reduce its forces prior to those negotiations. It would seem to me that reduction of forces may come as a result of the successful conclusion of the MBFR discussions.

There has been much commentary over the years that the American forces in Europe are there merely to provide a

U.S. presence. . . . Were this true, I do not think that we could justify that level of expenditures for so narrow a purpose. It would seem to me that when we spend as much as we spend for a conventional capability we must expect, as a Nation and as a Nation in an alliance, that these expenditures return true defense results rather than simply being a U.S. presence. . . .

I should stress at this point, however, that the dollar costs of keeping forces in Europe are very little higher than the dollar cost of keeping forces in the United States. The real impact comes on the balance-of-payments side. Shifting forces from Europe to the United States will not result in budget savings, although it would result in a substantial balance-of-payments relief.

We are engaged in discussion with our allies as to ways in which the cost impact of these U.S. forces are spread more broadly.

Soviet Capability

The tactical strength of the Soviet forces has been enhanced, and, of course, there is the slow expansion of the strategic forces program which has been partially interrupted by SALT I in that there are more missile holes there than there are missiles in them. But the expansion



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Cover Photo by Frank Hall

is the source of long-run concern. The Soviets have under development, for example, at least three new ICBMs.

The Soviets have a very aggressive development program, and, although it poses no immediate threat to the United States, we must pace our own strategic program so that there is no deterioration of the strategic balance.

As a general proposition, there is some numerical discrepancy between U.S. and Soviet forces in a sense as a result of SALT I. That discrepancy was acceptable because of the enhanced status of U.S. technology in this area vis-a-vis Soviet technology. What we are now

concerned about is that the Soviets may be in a position to acquire the technologies presently available to the United States, and this, together with their large number of launchers and their large throw weight capability, could be a source of some concern.

In my judgment, the Soviet aggressiveness in developing the strategic capabilities provides no basis whatsoever for us to relax at the present time. We should be prudent but we should not be careless.

DoD Cost Problems

We cannot, of course, prevent inflation nor control the fixed costs and

economy-wide trends that have substantial impact on Defense costs. But we will be doing all we can to hold down costs in the areas that are controllable. We will be working on both manpower costs and operating costs, as well as the costs of development and acquisition of weapon systems. In the manpower area, we are going to scrutinize with care our total requirements, especially in the support area, and we will also be looking to civilianize positions wherever possible. We intend to seek industrial and managerial efficiencies in the operations of the Department.

(Continued on Page Eight)


DoD Deputy Secretary Expresses Views on Wide Variety of Subjects

When former Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on May 24 as U.S. Attorney General, Deputy Secretary William P. Clements Jr. headed the Defense Department until James R. Schlesinger was confirmed as Secretary of Defense on June 28. Mr. Clements joined the Defense Department following his own confirmation on January 23.

Mr. Clements held his first Pentagon news conference recently and revealed his views on a wide variety of DoD subjects, including the morale of Department of Defense personnel, his working relationships with the new Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, and his concern with the increasing strength of Soviet Union armed forces.

In answer to a reporter's comment that, with a change in Secretaries of Defense, there had been a feeling that things have come to a slowdown in the Pentagon, Mr. Clements said: "I just cannot accept that. I think that we have been doing our business as usual. It is an astounding performance by this building and a high compliment to the Services and the personnel involved that I cannot detect any lost momentum or lost motion. I really think morale is extremely high. We are going about our business in the usual fashion. We are making these policy decisions to which you refer.

"I do not know of anything that is 'deferred' in this regard. I think that some of the actions that have been taken speak for themselves. This F-14 decision was certainly not one that I entered into lightly. The F-111 decision is not a small



WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS JR.
Deputy Secretary of Defense

decision, and especially for me. We are making other decisions with respect to the All-Volunteer Force; for instance: the task force that I have authorized is in being and is active and making some policy decisions with respect to these matters."

Asked about his professional working relationship with Mr. Schlesinger, the Deputy Secretary replied, "First of all, Jim Schlesinger and I have a very good relationship. We are members of several National Security Council committees together and these are working committees under the NSC such as, for instance, the Certification Panel which you are familiar with, that relates to SALT negotiations. We have had ample opportunity to work together and get to know

each other under these working conditions, which I think is a very good arrangement."

Later, in discussing the strength of Soviet Union armed forces, Mr. Clements said, "I look with apprehension on what the Soviets have been doing in regard to their defense measures, their budget, their research and development, their great advances in technology. All these things are worrisome. The facts speak for themselves. In some of these areas of weapon advancement and technology, they are, in fact, ahead of us. I think that our general public has been prone to think that we are superior in all these aspects and that is just not true.

"Now, at the same time that I say that, there is no question whatsoever that Russia and the United States have come a long way in their relationships with each other and the so-called atmosphere of detente. We are making strides toward commercial accommodation.

"However, regardless of whether we exchange students, and we have traveling basketball teams and we have commercial treaties of one form or another, and increased trade, or whether we increase our tourist reciprocities and that sort of thing, *what I am interested in is what capability the Russian armed forces have.* And, I am interested only in the sense of what are they capable of doing in that regard. When they continue their missile programs the way they do and they continue to do the other things that they are doing in a military sense, well, I have good reason for apprehension. I think most of the people in this building share my view."



In weapons acquisition, we must strive to implement policies like fly-before-buy and design-to-cost more widely. It will also be necessary to establish a clearer demarcation line between development and production and halt the momentum into production of systems that have completed development. If we are more selective about what is produced and fully implement the sound new policies that have been and will be developed, we should be able to make progress in controlling the growth in weapon acquisition costs.

Foreign Assistance

I believe the underlying premise of the Nixon Doctrine is that we should encourage greater self-help on the part of countries to build up their forces so that they can defend themselves, in the absence of U.S. ground forces in particu-

lar, and hopefully in the absence of U.S. air and naval forces. If this is the purpose, to reduce the prospect of U.S. involvement, I think that is a fairly attractive doctrine for all of us to embrace.

Nuclear-Powered Ships

I think that nuclear power for larger vessels has proved its worth and its relative cost effectiveness given its greater capability. Consequently, at this stage of the game it seems unlikely to me that anyone could demonstrate that a carrier should not be nuclear powered. The advantages of having nuclear-powered escorts with such a carrier reduces the need for a long logistic train. . . . Given the overall size of the procurement dollar, however, we must always be aware of the need to avoid anchoring ourselves to a small number of high-cost vessels as opposed to a larger number of lower-

cost vessels which might not be nuclear powered.

U.S. Forces in Thailand

There are at this time about 43,000 U.S. military personnel located at seven Thai bases. I believe that we must retain most of these forces in Thailand until we have been able to assess North Vietnam's performance on its obligations under the international agreements on Vietnam and until the situation in Indochina is more stabilized than it is at present. It is impossible at this time, given the continued fluidity and uncertainties in the Indochina situation, to predict how long it will be desirable to retain these forces. I can assure you, however, that we will be continually reassessing the situation with a view to drawing down our forces in Thailand just as soon as it appears prudent to do so.

Special Expertise in National Security

Former CIA Director Confirmed as New Secretary of Defense

Secretary James R. Schlesinger, a Harvard economist with special expertise in energy, politics, and national security, was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on June 28 as the 12th Secretary of Defense since the establishment of the Department of Defense in 1947. He succeeds former Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson, who was nominated by President Richard Nixon to be the U.S. Attorney General and whose confirmation to that position took place May 24.

Secretary Schlesinger had been the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency prior to accepting his new post. Previous to that, he had served the President in various capacities, beginning in 1969 when he was named Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget. It was there that he was responsible for framing the Administration's energy policy, particularly in relation to air and water pollution. He later served as Acting Director of the Bureau during its transition to Office of Management and Budget (OMB). During that period, Secretary Schlesinger served on the Administration's Environmental Quality Council which preceded the present Council on Environmental Quality.

From 1963 to 1969, he was Director of Strategic Studies at the Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California, where he specialized in strategic analysis with special reference to nuclear weaponry. While at Rand, he served as project leader of a study on nuclear proliferation which Rand undertook for the Federal Government.

For eight years prior to joining Rand, Secretary Schlesinger was an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia. He wrote a book, "The Political Economy of National Security," in 1960 and has written extensively on the role of systems analyses in relation to political decision-making.

He was a consultant to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and, while teaching at the University of Virginia, was the Academic Consultant in Economics to the U.S. Naval



JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
Secretary of Defense

War College in 1957.

Secretary Schlesinger graduated from Harvard University with a bachelor of arts degree in 1950. Economics was his major course of study, both as an undergraduate and graduate student. He stayed at Harvard, earning his master's degree in 1952 and his Ph.D. in 1956.

A native of New York City, Secretary Schlesinger was born February 15, 1929. He is married to the former Rachel Mellinger of Springfield, Ohio. They have eight children and live in Arlington, Virginia.